well into the twentieth century. The foundations of the new regimes took a long time to consolidate, and when this occurred the outcomes were often weak and unstable institutional systems.2 Most of the Libertadores -the founding fathers of the new republics -would not live to see their political work culminated, and ended their days in exile or at the hands of their adversaries. The old metropolis did not fare much better. In nineteenth-century Spain, insurrectional movements, military pronunciamientos and strongmen's rule were also the order of the day. Even if political power was constituted and upheld differently in each country -depending on the local land-owning structure, class relations, and ethnic cleavages -some practices, like patronage networks and praetorianism, were widespread and recurrent. While these features were certainly not unique to nineteenth-century Iberia and Latin America, their intensity and persistence were not equalled in other Western and North Atlantic regions. Attempts to create nominally liberal institutions in the absence of a recognizable liberal political culture have traditionally disconcerted interpreters of the Iberian world. As a result of this perplexity, nation-state formation in the region has sometimes been judged as a historical miscarriage and its liberal tradition disqualified for being allegedly fictitious or little more than a rhetorical exercise to mask the naked contest for power and the defence of encapsulated social privileges. Without reaching this extreme conclusion, Evelyne Huber and Frank Safford have recognized that, Even if we accept a simple formalistic definition of democracy, as a political system with responsible government and high levels of institutionalized contestation and political inclusion, and do not ask any questions about the reality of participation in political power by the masses, it is clear that there are very few countries in Latin America with a democratic trajectory.3
